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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CALVIN K. FLORENCE,

Plaintiff-Appellant
DEWAYNE IVERSON, BRUCE E. HOLMES,
HOLMES REALTY, a Utah Corporation,
JAMES R. GADDIS, GADDIS INVESTMENTS, a Utah Corporation,

Supreme Court
No. 20813

Defendants-Respondent

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
Appellants own testimony does not show that the
oral contract lacked consideration. Neither does
it show that it was a trilateral contract to which
the third party did not agree.
Respondent contends in his Statement of Facts that "Florence
alleges

and testified in his deposition that he thereafter requested and

obtained from Iverson an oral assurance that if Iverson knew of any
other property that the commission arrangement would remain the same
should Gaddis1 clients purchase other property"
added).

(P,3 - underscoring

In support of that he cites R89 and appellants deposition

Pp 14-15. There is no R 89.

The allegation

referred to is on R3

in paragraph 8. It reads as follows:
"At the time the aforesaid letter was
delivered to the defendant DeWayne Iverson
the plaintiff asked for and received an assurance from that said defendant that there would

be a three way s p l i t on any real estate commission that was earned as a result of any sale
effected as a result of the j o i n t efforts of
Gaddis Investment and DeWayne Iverson".
Certainly that allegation does not indicate that Florence's
performance of bringing the buyer's broker and the sellers agent together
preceeded

the oral agreement,

At best i t is s i l e n t as to such sequence.

As for the other c i t a t i o n the substance of the questioning of Florence
by Iverson's counsel reads as follows;
"Q. I f I understand what you said, that
is what you said to Mr. Iverson a f t e r you had
handed him the l e t t e r and he had given you the
Karen Lee description.
A. Yes, depending on before or after. That's
the general conversation that was had that morning."
I t seems clear from Florence's response to counsels leading
question that he qualified his affirmance by not accepting the se quence
of events unless they conformed to his re collection.

Otherwise what

does "depending" mean?
So much for the unenforceability of the oral contract based
on lack of consideration.
As for the lack of consent of a necessary party, respondent's
counsel here cites no authority f o r the proposition that A cannot make
a contract with B that obligates B in his dealings with C to arrange
for compensation for A for services A agrees to render which w i l l
benefit both B and C.

His only argument in support of his ipse d i x i t

is the assertion that "the language of the alleged promise to Florence

purports to set up a t r i - l a t e r a l agreement, and the agreement of
P.10
Gaddis, the third essential party was never obtained"/ What is the
"language11 to which he refers?

Where is i t found?

In order for Gaddis

to be obligated to share his commission obviously he would have to
agree to do so but such agreement could be made by him with Iverson
(who had to do i t for his own benefit in any event) for the benefit
of both Florence and Iverson as well as for Iverson's benefit alone.
At the very least this shows a genuine dispute as to a material fact,
to wit;

whether a t r i - l a t e r a l contract was contemplated by the

parties to this appeal and thus summary disposition would be unwarranted.
POINT II
Appellants own testimony does not show he was not
qualified to enforce the implied contract arising
from an applicable trade and business practice. No
law of the case bars recovery on that claim.
Respondent contends that "work" on the particular sale is
essential to claim a share under the implied contract based on an
applicable trade and custom (it is to be noted that respondent has
never

contended in either his memorandum in support of his motion for

summary judgment nor in his brief in this court that there is not such
a trade

custom)

See P. 14. He contends that without such work

there is no "participation".

Nothing in the record indicates such

equivalance,much less is it made conclusive.

In fact the only comment

made in that matter in the entire record is that of Florence on Page
25 of his deposition when asked the following question by Iverson's
Attorney;

"Q. Did you perform any service by way of
contract with either the buyer or the seller of the
Brittany Apartments as distinguished from the Karen
Lee Apartments?
A. The only service that I rendered on the Karen
Lee Apartments was to put these two brokers together".
Certainly there could be no question that his services would
have qualified for a share of the commission if the Karen Lee had been
purchased rather than the Brittany Apartments and it was recognized by
both of these parties on August 26th that the property to be purchased
might well be one other than the Karen Lee when Florence said "Now, if
this Karen Lee doesn't work and there is something else that you know
of, let's get it out on the table
added.)

"

(Dep. 15) -(underscoring

Can it be said as a matter of law that the custom and trade

practice in questio nrequires more than bringing of the selling and
buying brokers or agents together?
As for the law of the case, respondent cites no authorities
for the proposition that an adverse ruling on one claim (express oral
contract) bars recovery on a different claim against a different defendant if the order concluding the case against such other party encompasses the same type claim now being asserted against the remaining
defendant.

Would the result be the same or different

had been initiated by the party palintiff?

if the dismissal

Must the law require a

claimant to treat each party claimed against in the same manner just
because the nature of the claims are identical?
seems to refute it.

To state the proposition

In any event such must not have support in

law or respondent would certainly have cited it.

case

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I.

Appellant alleged and testified in his deposition

that there was a bilateral oral contract to which respondent agreed,
to wit: that the sale's commission should be divided three ways and
his performance by bringing the selling agent and buyer's broker together was full

performance of that contract regardless of what

property was sold.

The agreement was

entered into before there was

performance by the Appellant.
Point II. Appellant alleged and testified in his deposition that his participation in bringing the contracting parties together met performance of the
estate to

admitted custom and

practice in real

share commissions when two or more brokers are involved.

No law of the case precluded appellant from proceeding on his implied
contract claim because he did not appeal the dismissal of the oral
contract claim against Gaddis as he never claimed Gaddis was a

party

to that contract.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's testimony cited in his deposition does not
establish as a matter of law that he has no claim as such testimony
is consistent with the pleading in his complaint wherein he bases
his claim on a bilateral oral contract made with respondent which
required the payment to him of a share of the commission for the
services rendered in bringing the selling agent together with buyers
broker and that said services were to be so paid for whether the purchase was made of the Karen Lee property or any other property.

Nothing in his complaint or testimony indicates that a trilateral
contract was contemplated.
Appellants testimony cited in his deposition does not
establish as a matter of law that appellant did not participate to
such an extent that the implied contract based on an applicable trade
practice would not entitle

him to compensation.

No law of the case

bars recovery on the implied in law contract claim.
Respectfully submitted this

lO^

day of January, 1985.

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
1986, a true and correct copy of

day of January

Appellant's Reply Brief was served

on Respondent by hand delivering a copy there to:
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER
Earl D. Tanner, Esq.
Brad L. Englund, Esq.
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney for Appellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CALVIN K. FLORENCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Supreme Court
No. 20813

vs.
DEWAYNE IVERSON, BRUCE E. HOLMES,
HOLMES REALTY, a Utah Corporation
JAMES R. 6ADDIS, GADDIS INVESTMENTS, a Utah Corporation,
Defendan ts-Respondent
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the Third Judicial D i s t r i c t Court
of Salt Lake County
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge

Robert B. Hansen, Esq.
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Appellant
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER
Earl D. Tanner, Esq.
Brad L. Englund, Esq.
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.

POINT II.

CONCLUSION

5

Appellants own testimony does not
show that the oral contract lacked
consideration. Neither does it show
that it was a trilateral contract to
which the third pary did not agree

1

Appellants own testimony does not show
he was not qualified to enforce the implied contract arising from an applicable trade and business practice. No
law of the case bars recovery on that
claim

3

5

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CALVIN K. FLORENCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant
DEWAYNE IVERSON, BRUCE E. HOLMES,
HOLMES REALTY, a Utah Corporation,
JAMES R. GADDIS, GADDIS INVESTMENTS, a Utah Corporation,

Supreme Court
No. 20813

Defendants-Respondent

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
Appellants own testimony does not show that the
oral contract lacked consideration. Neither does
it show that it was a trilateral contract to which
the third party did not agree.
Respondent contends in his Statement of Facts that "Florence
alleges

and testified in his deposition that he thereafter requested and

obtained from Iverson an oral assurance that if Iverson knew of any
other property that the commission arrangement would remain the same
should Gaddis1 clients purchase other property"
added).
Pp 14-15.

(P,3 - underscoring

In support of that he cites R89 and appellants deposition
There is no R 89.

in paragraph 8.

The allegation

referred to is on R3

It reads as follows:

"At the time the aforesaid letter was
delivered to the defendant DeWayne Iverson
the plaintiff asked for and received an assurance from that said defendant that there would

be a three way s p l i t on any real estate commission that was earned as a result of any sale
effected as a result of the j o i n t efforts of
Gaddis Investment and DeWayne Iverson".
Certainly that allegation does not indicate that Florence's
performance of bringing the buyer's broker and the sellers agent together
preceeded

the oral agreement,

At best i t is s i l e n t as to such sequence.

As for the other c i t a t i o n the substance of the questioning of Florence
by Iverson's counsel reads as follows:
"Q. I f I understand what you said, that
is what you said to Mr. Iverson a f t e r you had
handed him the l e t t e r and he had given you the
Karen Lee description.
A. Yes, depending on before or a f t e r . That's
the general conversation that was had that morning."
I t seems clear from Florence's response to counsels leading
question that he qualified his affirmance by not accepting the se quence
of events unless they conformed to his re collection.

Otherwise what

does "depending" mean?
So much for the unenforceability of the oral contract based
on lack of consideration.
As for the lack of consent of a necessary party, respondent's
counsel here cites no authority f o r the proposition that A cannot make
a contract with B that obligates B in his dealings with C to arrange
for compensation f o r A for services A agrees to render which w i l l
benefit both B and C.

His only argument in support of his ipse d i x i t

is the assertion that "the language of the alleged promise to Florence

purports to set up a tri-lateral agreement, and the agreement of
P.10
Gaddis, the third essential party was never obtained'1/ What is the
"language" to which he refers?

Where is it found?

In order for Gaddis

to be obligated to share his commission obviously he would have to
agree to do so but such agreement could be made by him with Iverson
(who had to do it for his own benefit in any event) for the benefit
of both Florence and Iverson as well as for Iverson's benefit alone.
At the very least this shows a genuine dispute as to a material fact,
to wit:

whether a tri-lateral contract was contemplated by the

parties to this appeal and thus summary disposition would be unwarranted.
POINT II
Appellants own testimony does not show he was not
qualified to enforce the implied contract arising
from an applicable trade and business practice. No
law of the case bars recovery on that claim.
Respondent contends that "work" on the particular sale is
essential to claim a share under the implied contract based on an
applicable trade and custom (it is to be noted that respondent has
never contended in either his memorandum in support of his motion for
summary judgment nor in his brief in this court that there is not such
a trade

custom)

See P. 14.

there is no "participation".

He contends that without such work

Nothing in the record indicates such

equivalance,much less is it made conclusive.

In fact the only comment

made in that matter in the entire record is that of Florence on Page
25 of his deposition when asked the following question by Iverson's
Attorney;

"Q. Did you perform any service by way of
contract with either the buyer or the seller of the
Brittany Apartments as distinguished from the Karen
Lee Apartments?
A. The only service that I rendered on the Karen
Lee Apartments was to put these two brokers together".
Certainly there could be no question that his services would
have qualified for a share of the commission if the Karen Lee had been
purchased rather than the Brittany Apartments and it was recognized by
both of these parties on August 26th that the property to be purchased
might well be one other than the Karen Lee when Florence said "Now, if
this Karen Lee doesn't work and there is something else that you know
of, let's get it out on the table
added.)

"

(Dep. 15) -(underscoring

Can it be said as a matter of law that the custom and trade

practice in questio nrequires more than bringing of the selling and
buying brokers or agents together?
As for the law of the case, respondent cites no authorities
for the proposition that an adverse ruling on one claim (express oral
contract) bars recovery on a different claim against a different defendant if the order concluding the case against such other party encompasses the same type claim now being asserted against the remaining
defendant.

Would the result be the same or different

had been initiated by the party palintiff?

if the dismissal

Must the law require a

claimant to treat each party claimed against in the same manner just
because the nature of the claims are identical?
seems to refute it.

To state the proposition

In any event such must not have support in

law or respondent would certainly have cited it.

case

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I.

Appellant alleged and testified in his deposition

that there was a bilateral oral contract to which respondent agreed,
to wit: that the sale's commission should be divided three ways and
his performance by bringing the selling agent and buyer's broker together was full

performance of that contract regardless of what

property was sold.

The agreement was

entered into before there was

performance by the Appellant.
Point II. Appellant alleged and testified in his deposition that his participation in bringing the contracting parties together met performance of the
estate to

admitted custom and

practice in real

share commissions when two or more brokers are involved.

No law of the case precluded appellant from proceeding on his implied
contract claim because he did not appeal the dismissal of the oral
contract claim against Gaddis as he never claimed Gaddis was a

party

to that contract.
CONCLUSION
Appellants testimony cited in his deposition does not
establish as a matter of law that he has no claim as such testimony
is consistent with the pleading in his complaint wherein he bases
his claim on a bilateral oral contract made with respondent which
required the payment to him of a share of the commission for the
services rendered in bringing the selling agent together with buyers
broker and that said services were to be so paid for whether the purchase was made of the Karen Lee property or any other property.

Nothing in his complaint or testimony indicates that a trilateral
contract was contemplated.
Appellants testimony cited in his deposition does not
establish as a matter of law that appellant did not participate to
such an extent that the implied contract based on an applicable trade
practice would not entitle

him to compensation.

No law of the case

bars recovery on the implied in law contract claim.
Respectfully submitted this

JO^

day of January, 1985.
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